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In response to global market forces such as deregulation and globalization, technological change and 
digital convergence, the telecommunications in the 1990s witnessed an enormous worldwide round of 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A). Given both M&A and Innovation a major means of today’s competitive 
strategy development, this paper examines the innovation determinants of M&A activity and the 
consequences of M&A transactions on the technological potential and the innovation performance. We 
examine the telecommunications equipment industry over the period 1988-2002 using a newly 
constructed data set with firm-level data on M&A and innovation activity as well as financial 
characteristics. By implementing a counterfactual technique based on a matching propensity score 
procedure, the analysis not only controls for merger endogeneity and ex-ante observable firms 
characteristics but also takes account of unobserved heterogeneity. The study provides evidence that 
M&A realize significantly positive changes to the firm’s post-merger innovation performance. The effects 
of M&A on innovation performance are in turn driven by both the success in Research and Development 
(R&D) activity and the deterioration in internal technological capabilities at acquiring firms prior to a 
merger.     
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The telecommunications industry is moving fast both on the technology front and in terms of 
structure. A recent surge of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in the telecommunications 
industry is a reflection of the drastically changing environment of the market.1 Deregulation and 
liberalization, technological innovation and digital convergence and the evolving requirements 
of the capital markets have driven dramatic changes in the telecommunications industry as a 
whole. The industry in turn has sparked fundamental changes in the economic landscape 
worldwide. As the telecommunications firms face increasing exposure to international 
competition, the industry has undergone a radical transformation creating exciting new 
opportunities and new challenges for infrastructure and service providers (Li and Whalley, 
2002). Market winners are in most cases also technology leaders or highly capable of turning a 
base technology into a superior product that meets the customer needs (Brodt and Knoll, 2004). 
The rapid technological change, growing technological complexity and the shortening 
of product life cycles add new dimensions to an already complex scenario and increasingly 
force firms to source technologies externally. Firms will often prefer M&A to other cooperative 
approaches of R&D network building, e.g., R&D joint ventures, because M&A provide an 
immediate controlling presence in the new, fast expanding market, rather than having to 
gradually build a new business or negotiate with a partner about developing a cooperation 
(Caves, 1982; Capron and Mitchell, 1997). While several analyses have stressed that the 
telecommunications industry has undergone major restructuring in the 1990s through intense 
M&A activity (e.g., Jamison, 1998; Kim, 2005; Rosenberg, 1998, Warf, 2003), we are not 
aware of any study which investigates the linkage between recent rises both in M&A and 
innovation activity. The goal of this paper is to uncover the keen reliance of the 
telecommunications firms on M&A as a technology sourcing strategy. 
We aim at providing an answer to the following question: Why do firms in the 
telecommunications industry increasingly use M&A as a technology source? Does M&A affect 
the innovation performance of firms involved as their proponents expect? Before attempting to 
determine this task, however, a more basic question needs to be addressed, namely: Does the 
innovation activity of firms depict a significant predictor of entering the M&A market? 
Admittedly, technological reasons do not motivate all M&A. M&A can be motivated, for 
instance, by the desire to obtain financial synergies or market power, to obtain access to 
distribution channels, and/or to gain entry into new markets.2 Such M&A may not be able to be 
                                                 
1 Between 1996 and 2001, more than twenty M&A deals worth over $20 billion took place in the telecom sector, 14 
of which were in the US. Telecom mergers amount for seven of the largest operations announced in 2000, and eight 
out of the ten largest of all times (Le Blanc and Shelanski, 2002). 
2 For extensive review, see Shimizu et al. (2004) 
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directly expected to improve the firms’ innovation performance. However, in high technology 
industries where innovation is key to a competitive advantage, firms will incorporate the impact 
of M&A on technological performance even when the transaction is not innovation-driven, thus 
choosing the most appropriate innovation and financial strategies. Moreover, to the extent that 
access to technology and know-how become increasingly important to succeed in the market, 
factors such as the firm’s size, history and equity become less and less critical requirements. 
This allows new challengers to realize tremendous growth rates. Furthermore, it spurs the quest 
for external knowledge sourcing both at the established and new firms in the market. As 
innovation is becoming indispensable for strategic competitiveness in the high technology 
industry, we ask: How do firms that choose M&A and firms that stay outside of the M&A 
market differ with respect to their innovation performance? The follow up question is then, what 
are the effects of M&A on the innovative performance of firms if we control for the differences 
in innovation performance prior to M&A activities? 
Though occurrence of M&A has grown dramatically in the last years, academic 
research on the relationship between innovation and M&A has not kept pace with the changes. 
In spite of the vast and rapidly growing body of literature on M&A,3 empirical evidence which 
has explored this relationship is rather limited and often inconclusive.4 The literature on the 
technological effects of M&A shows contradictory implications. On the one hand, M&A may 
build up competencies and foster innovation for a number of reasons. M&A can reduce high 
transaction costs related to the transmission of knowledge between firms (Bresman et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, in fast moving markets with abbreviated product life cycles, firms may perceive 
that they do not have the time to develop the required skills and knowledge internally, and 
therefore, turn outward to M&A. In this sense, M&A may offer a quick access to knowledge 
assets (Warner et al., 2006). Moreover, M&A may extend the technological base of firms 
involved allowing them to achieve greater economies of scale and scope through more efficient 
deployment of knowledge resources. Also, M&A may enlarge the overall R&D budget of firms 
engaged, which then enables them to tackle larger R&D projects and, thereby, this spreads the 
risk of innovation. In addition, the integration of complementary knowledge may also increase 
innovation through M&A leading to more advanced technologies being developed (Gerpott, 
1995). Finally, by exchanging the best practices on innovation management within the 
combined entity, firms may employ efficient technology integration. 
On the other hand, innovation-driven M&A encompass the difficulties associated with 
innovation as well as the obstacles faced in mergers. First of all, differences in corporate culture, 
processes and knowledge base may impede a smooth transition of knowledge (Lane and 
                                                 
3 For review see Roeller et al. (2001) and Shimizu et al. (2004)  
4 For review see Veugelers (2005)  
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Lubatkin, 1998; Very, 1997). Furthermore, M&A integration process is time consuming and 
costly. This may divert management attention away from innovation (Hitt et al., 1996). Also, 
trade off payment of debt and debt costs for investment in R&D can occur due to M&A (Hitt et 
al., 1990). In addition, a disadvantage of M&A is that it involves entire firms whereas the 
advantages for knowledge exchange may be limited to only a small part of the firms involved. 
In M&A, knowledge beyond that required is also acquired. This may cause indigestibility: a 
firm may acquire more knowledge than it can use in a meaningful way (Hennart and Reddy, 
1997). Finally, as the literature has shown, technologically motivated and intensive acquisitions 
are highly vulnerable to failure (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). One of the main reasons for this value 
destruction lies in the miscarried and inappropriate integration of the technology-based firm 
after the acquisition (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000). Even when the merger is successful in 
terms of the integration of R&D departments, in other business areas the merger may not be a 
success, thereby influencing a disintegration of the entire firm. 
One of the main reasons for the contradictions and inconclusiveness of previous studies 
might be due to cross-industry investigations. Consequently, this study provides empirical 
evidence on our research questions by examining the M&A that took place between 
telecommunications equipment firms during the 1988 to 2002 period. This period witnessed an 
enormous wave of mergers that dramatically reconfigured the market structure of global 
telecommunications equipment as a result of international competition stemming from the 
liberalization of its market and pace of technological evolution (see figure 1 in Appendix). 
Lying at the core of the telecommunications industry, the telecommunications equipment 
industry takes a central role in the technological transformation of the entire industry. As the 
trade and regulatory liberalization primarily has globalized the demand for telecommunications 
equipment, technological change in the industry has had upstream effects on R&D (see figure 2 
in Appendix). Moreover, the growth in the patenting has been tremendous - from 1988 to 1998 
the number of communication equipment patents applied by the UPSTO increased by more than 
four times (see figure 3 in Appendix).5  
The aim of the analysis is twofold: first, we investigate the impact of success in 
innovation activity on the likelihood that a firm engages in a merger, and second, we analyze the 
effect of a merger on a firm’s innovation performance. In order to explore the link between the 
effects of a merger and the reasons and expectations behind the transaction, we use a treatment 
effect estimation approach with endogenous selection using a matching propensity score 
technique. As propensity score matching estimation takes account of observable characteristics 
                                                 
5 The abrupt fall in the patent applications after 1998 in figure 3 is primarily caused by the truncation of the patent 
data sample. We have patents which were granted by 2002. Thus, we end our analysis on patents in 2000 because, in 
the subsequent years, a truncation due to the grant lag appears to be more visible. 
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of firms and to that extend its results can indicate the net effect of casual status on performance 
outcomes, we also control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
We find that the telecommunications equipment firms undertake M&A in order to 
strengthen their success in innovation, and thereby, their market position. While the equipment 
manufacturers, which experienced low research productivity from ongoing exploitation of R&D 
efforts in the past, are forced to explore potential future innovation trajectories in new business 
units by acquisitions, those firms with a declining inventive portfolio are involved in pooling 
mergers to offer comprehensive and integrated equipment solutions. Finally, equipment firms in 
telecommunications outsource R&D through M&A as a means of revitalizing a firm by 
enhancing and supplementing its knowledge base effectively. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 draws a broad picture on the developments in 
telecommunications equipment industry with regard to its M&A and R&D activities. Section 3 
discusses the theoretical underpinnings of our research questions. Data description is provided 
in Section 4, while empirical methodology is presented in Section 5. We report empirical results 
and analyze their sensitivity with respect to unobserved heterogeneity in Sections 6 and 7.  
Section 8 concludes with discussion of our findings.   
 
 
2 Theoretical Background  
 
Technological change influences the ability of firms to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external competencies in order to address altering competitive and technological challenges. 
Dosi (1988) described the technological changes to be continuous or incremental because they 
reflect a path dependent and cumulative development as a technological paradigm or pattern of 
inquiry. Incremental change tends to reinforce the market power of incumbent firms because it 
utilizes existing competencies in development and can be deployed through an established set of 
sales and marketing resources (Teece, 1996). Accumulated prior knowledge and heuristics 
constitute the learning capabilities that permits incumbents to acquire related problem-solving 
knowledge. Thereby, learning capabilities involve the development of the capacity to assimilate 
existing knowledge, while problem-solving skills represent a capacity to create new knowledge; 
and they are mutually inclusive. 
However, to the extent that the innovation embodies new skills or knowledge, 
incumbents can be hindered in responding as they may have little or no relevant development 
history to draw upon (Dosi, 1988). Cohen and Levinthal (1989) elucidated the two faces of 
R&D activity. That is, R&D activity does not only stimulate innovation, but it also enhances the 
firms’ ability to assimilate outside knowledge. The second face of R&D is called the absorptive 
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capacity, and it is considered to be crucial particularly for assessing the effective contribution by 
spillovers from others. Defined as a set of knowledge and competencies, the firm's knowledge 
base remains a preliminary condition in the assimilation of spillovers from R&D efforts of 
environment. For Rosenberg (1990), fundamental research inside the firm has strong 
complementarities with external R&D. All in all, both Cohen & Levinthal and Rosenberg insist 
on potential synergies between the firm's own knowledge base and external flows of scientific 
and technical knowledge. In order to fulfill technological challenges, firms must absorb the 
environmental information on innovation and eventually be able to exploit it through new 
products or processes in the market. Thus, the responsiveness of R&D activity to exploit 
external knowledge flows is an indication of the importance of absorptive capacity. In industries 
like telecommunications, this response must be quick due to highly competitive conditions 
caused by short product lifecycles, new technologies, frequent entry by unexpected outsiders, 
repositioning of incumbents and radical redefinitions of market boundaries as ICT industries 
converge. Highly reactive firms with highly absorptive capacities will not wait for failure to 
spur development. By contributing R&D to the firms’ absorptive capacity, however, it should be 
noted that technological performance does not necessarily depend on past or referential 
performance, but rather on absorptive capacity generated in the past. In other words, firms with 
high absorptive capacity will exploit new ideas regardless of their past performance. 
Firms, especially those with high technological content, strive to overcome constraints 
aligned with cost, appropriation, absorptive capacity and time regarding R&D performance. 
Thus, firms are faced with the associated objectives of developing a response to an innovation 
and doing so in a timely fashion. Therefore, there is a crucial strategic choice to be made for 
firms that decide to conduct R&D activities. Most theories of economic organization which rely 
on a comparison of costs or benefits per transaction to explain the organization of economic 
activity have typically ignored the possibility of multiple innovation sources. The theoretical 
literature, drawing on transaction costs economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981) and 
property rights theory (Hart and Moore, 1986), considers the choice between external sourcing 
and internal development as substitutes, i.e., the classical make-or-buy decision. Technological 
know-how is often tacit and can, therefore, not be easily transmitted from one firm to another 
(Larsson et al., 1998). In order to avoid high transaction costs, firms may be induced to engage 
in internal R&D to solve problems related to the transmission of tacit knowledge (Bresman et 
al., 1999). At the same time, internal developments may be perceived by firms because of the 
high risk due to the low probability of the innovation success and the length of required time for 
the innovations to provide adequate returns (Hundley et al., 1996). Thus, firms prefer to invest 
fewer resources in internal R&D when faced with resource constraints or attractive external 
innovation sources exist. It is argued that the acquisitions of firms with an innovative portfolio 
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of interest often represent more certainty and lower risk of exploiting knowledge assets than 
new ventures do (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). Engaging in acquisitions, firms, however, may trade 
off payment of debt and debt costs for investment in R&D. That is, as the innovation 
developments embed assets that are largely non-redeployable, firms are likely to prefer the use 
of debt to fund acquisitions rather than to support innovation activities (Hitt et al., 1990). 
However, due to the fact that the financial and innovation strategies of future-oriented firms are 
jointly decided, a financial lack is imperative for firms pursuing a competitive strategy premised 
on innovation. Hence, the mutually exclusive choice between these innovation strategies is too 
restrictive. Moreover, R&D strategy adopted by a firm depends on its environment and on 
differences in the abilities of the firms to conduct R&D activities.  
The studies inspired by the resource- and knowledge-based approaches argue that a firm 
can rely on a combination of different strategies to engage in innovation. To justify the 
desideratum of the external technology source, it is essential to attend to the increasing evidence 
that a firm’s size and position within the industry affects the nature and the type of innovation in 
which it is engaged (Hart and Ramanantsoa, 1992; Christensen, 1997). On the one hand, 
pursuing to develop the knowledge and to create a new one internally, firms might be 
particularly blocked from adjusting from environment by their prior success in developing 
competencies. The former competencies may become rigidities or barriers to performance for 
radical or significant developments rather than for minor or incremental innovations since the 
latter are technological changes that are close to the current expertise. This is distinctive to 
established firms in the market or market leaders, mostly large firms, which tend to innovate in 
order to reinforce their positions or to enhance their core competencies. Having less to gain 
from a radically new design than a market challenger, they are less likely to pursue disruptive 
technologies or to embrace new innovations which would threaten their dominance. The 
improvements on their R&D can be, indeed, significant, but they are not likely to change their 
status quo. Moreover, the ongoing exploitation of the existing knowledge and capabilities, even 
those that make an organization successful for a certain time, after a certain point hinders the 
creation of new knowledge and eventually leads to a technological exhaustion (March, 1991; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These self-reinforcing capacities can also create competency-
destroying technological change. Thus, a disruption in the innovation activity of firms may 
force them to turn outward to external technology source. Nevertheless, distinctive knowledge 
bases of internal and external sources can be particularly valuable under conditions of 
technological uncertainty (Sorenson and Sorensen, 2001) and might be of use in creating 
knowledge complementarities. 
On the other hand, new firms or market challengers, mostly small firms, are more 
entrepreneurial and can respond more quickly to unexpected opportunities. By creating new 
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fields of technology or new skills where the market leader does not have an expertise or an 
established position, they are looking for opportunities to upset the leader’s position and to 
radically change the competitive situation, thus eliminating or diminishing the leader’ market 
dominance. While they are more likely to fail, they are more willing or able to venture into 
completely new directions because they have less of a vested interest in the current technology 
and are not tied to sunk investments in obsolete technologies. At the same time, small 
challengers have fewer resources to spend on R&D and because there is a lack of strong 
enterprise channels, they are less likely to have the resources to bring an invention to the 
marketplace. This lack of manufacturing and distributing activity can be filled by large firms 
which possess a greater ability to finance a large amount of R&D as well. 
 
 
3 Data Description 
 
In order to examine the interaction between merger6 and innovation activity, a new firm-level 
database is constructed which covers all firms in the telecommunications equipment industry 
that operated in any year over the 18 years period, 1987 to 2004 (including lagged periods). This 
database is created by complex matching process of information from initially four separate data 
sets. The first two datasets include firms’ financial characteristics and the additional two data 
sets describe the firms’ merger and innovation activities, respectively. 
We define the telecommunications equipment firms as those which have primary 
activity in the communications equipment Standard International Codes (SIC) 3661, 3663, or 
3669. The population of firms and their financial information including R&D expenditures were 
drawn from Compustat and Global Vantage databases. After eliminating firms with missing 
financial information, we could identify a sample of 638 telecommunications equipment firms 
for those a data on R&D expenditures, total assets, market value, cash flow, long term debt were 
available.  
Our patent statistics for the telecommunications equipment industry are based on the 
database which is compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, Hall et al., 
2001). This database comprises detailed information on all US patents granted between 1963 
and 2002 and all patent citations made between 1975 and 2002. The patent and citations data 
were procured originally from the US Patent Office and from Derwent Information Services, 
respectively. Although this US data could imply a bias in favor of US firms and against non-US 
firms, the group of non-US firms in this sample represents a group of innovative and rather 
large firms that are known to patent worldwide. Our database includes information on the patent 
                                                 
6 We employ, hereafter, the term “merger” to define both merger and acquisition if not otherwise indicated. 
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number, the application and grant dates, the detailed technology field(s) of the innovation, the 
name(s) of the inventors, the city and state from which the patent was filed and citations of prior 
patents on which the current work builds. Following the classification in Hall et al. (2001), we 
include the patents for which firms applied in twelve main classes of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) 178, 333, 340, 342, 343, 358, 367, 370, 375, 379, 385 or 455 - in the 
category communication equipment. As the distribution of the value of patented innovations is 
extremely skewed, we also consider the number of forward citations as an indicator of the 
importance or the value of innovations for each patent, thereby overcoming the limitations of 
simple counts (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Griliches, 1990). During the observed period, 
251 firms from our sample have applied for a total of 11,226 patents in communication 
equipment (including multiple applications by the same firm in the same year and for the whole 
period); this produces a total of 86,442 citations.7  
M&A transaction data were obtained from the Thomson One Banker-Deals database. 
Updated daily, the database offers detailed information on merger transactions including target 
and acquirer profiles, deal terms, financial and legal advisor assignments, deal value and deal 
status. This database includes alliances with a deal value of more than 1 million USD, thus 
ensuring that the overwhelming majority of mergers are covered. Our initial sample on merger 
transactions contains information on 364 completed deals (including multiple deals by the same 
firm in the same year and during the observed period) carried out by 178 firms and announced 
during the period from 1988 to 2002. Using information from the data source, we distinguished 
between the role that a firm played in a M&A transaction and classified the firms in our sample 
in generally as an acquirer, the firm which purchased the stock or other equity interests of 
another entity or acquired all or a substantial portion of its assets; a target, the firm which sold a 
significant amount or all of itself to another firm; or a partner in a pooling merger, the firm 
which pooled its assets with another firm or merged with another firm of approximately equal 
size. Out of 364 M&A transactions, we could identify 217 acquirer, 25 targets and 122 partners 
in pooling mergers.8 Furthermore, 59.6% of all of the mergers involve innovative firms, i.e., 
firms that applied for at least one patent during the observed period. While 84.8% of the merger 
firms took part up to three times in a merger, we can observe that the merger activity of the 
telecommunications equipment industry is characterized by the transactions of certain firms.9 
For our econometric analysis, we restrict the multiple transactions carried out by one firm in the 
                                                 
7 The data set is truncated, which might cause a downward bias in the citation counts of recent patents. 
8 We lack financial data on the target firms for transactions that involve the acquisitions mostly of a privately held 
and/or a relatively small firms that are not operated in the US and not listed in Global Vantage. 
9 For instance, the large-scale firms such as Ericsson, Siemens, ADC Telecommunications, Motorola and Alcatel 
carried out 17.86% of the total merger transactions. 
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same year to the largest transaction only.10 Finally, the estimation sample consists of total 300 
M&A transactions, which involve 186 acquirer, 22 targets and 94 partners in pooling mergers. 
The databases were matched on the basis of firm names, CUSIP numbers11 and address 
information provided by each database. The firms that are lacking information or have 
inadequate data on the matching procedure were cross-checked and completed with information 
reported in the Dun & Bradstreet’s “Who owns whom” annual issues. 
 
 
4 Econometric Methodology 
 
4.1  Estimating the Propensity to Merge 
We start our analysis by exploring the determinants of mergers and by investigating the 
attractiveness of telecommunications equipment firms as merger candidates. Employing a 
random utility model, we consider the firm i ’s decision of whether to acquire, to be acquired, to 
have involvement in a pooling merger or to stay outside the merger market. The utilities 
associated with each of these choices k  are modeled as a function of the firm’s characteristics 
iX  which affect the utilities differently: 
 
= +ik i k ikU X eβ                                                                                                                          (1)                                                                                              
 
While the level of utility is not observable, we can, however, infer from the firms’ choices how 
they rank each of these alternatives. If we assume that the 
ij
e  are distributed Weibull, the 
differences in the disturbances are distributed logistic and a multinomial logit can be used to 
estimate the differences in the parameters β . 
The propensity of engaging in a merger is modeled as a function of the firm’s 
characteristics. We base the analysis on a panel that consists of innovation-related and financial 
variables on both merged and non-merged firms for which data were available during the 1988 
to 2002 period. The probability that firm i  chooses alternative k  is specified 
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exp X exp X
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β β β
                                            (2)                                                                       
                                                 
10 The frequency of merger transactions carried out by one firm in the same year is as follows: 294 firms with one 
deal, 44 firms with two deals, six firms with three deals, and three firms with four deals in a given year during the 
sample period.  




where 1 m,...,β β are m vectors of unknown regression parameters. 
An important property of the multinomial logit model is that relative probabilities are 
independent from each other, which is the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property. In order to obtain robust standard errors of estimated coefficients, appropriate 
tests were conducted, which are discussed in Section 5.1. 
In the following, we explain the determinants of a merger captured by our analysis and 
assess the appropriateness and plausibility of the merger choice. Summary statistics of the 
variables are shown in table 1.12  
The innovation performance of a firm is examined with respect to its R&D input, R&D 
output, the stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D efforts, and the research 
productivity. R&D input and R&D output of firms are measured by their R&D expenditure13 
and the number of patent applications that are actually granted, respectively. As a strong 
relationship exists between the size of the firm and its R&D expenditure and total number of 
patents, as suggested by common innovation studies, we took the ratios of the R&D 
expenditures and the patent counts to the total assets; we then defined them as R&D intensity 
and patent intensity, respectively. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to account not only for the quantity but also the quality of the patented 
inventions, we measured the patent-based characteristics of a firm using the number of forward 
citations of patents. The number of citations received by any given patent is truncated in time 
because we only know about the citations received thus far. In other words, the number of 
forward citations a patent received depends on the year of the application. We, therefore, 
normalize the citation counts by their average value calculated over all patents belonging to the 
same technological sub-class whose application was filed in the same year.14 We then weight 
each patent of a firm by the number of normalized citations that it subsequently received 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). 
The stock of accumulated knowledge of a firm is measured using citation-based patents 
and calculated by applying the perpetual inventory method by assuming a depreciation rate of 
15% per annum (Hall, 1990). Hence, the individual patents in the firm’s knowledge base 
                                                 
12 We checked that there exists no multicollinearity among selected variables. 
13 R&D expenditures involve both current and capital expenditures, where the current expenditures are composed of 
labor costs and other current costs, and the capital expenditures are the annual gross expenditures on fixed assets used 
in the R&D projects of firms. 
14 This is the fixed-effects approach proposed in Hall et al. (2001) 
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provide the basis for comparing the firm’s own knowledge base with that of other firms. R&D 
productivity, defined as the ratio of citation-weighted patent to R&D expenditure, accounts for 
the firm’s research productivity. Research productivity may be interpreted as the efficiency with 
which R&D brings forth new and useful knowledge. 
Since financial profiles of firms are likely to influence both their innovative and merger 
activity, we also include the firms’ financial characteristics. To express all monetary values in 
real terms, we employ the U.S. industry-based Producer Price Index with basis year 1999. All 
covariates in the regressions have been lagged by one year in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems as well as possible biases arising from different merger accounting 
methods and financial statement consolidation. 
Firm size is proxied by the book value of the total assets. Some empirical evidence has 
shown that the purchase of larger companies is positively related to post-merger performance, as 
larger targets can benefit the buyer in terms of economies of scale, a larger resource base and a 
larger customer base (Seth, 1990; Loderer and Martin, 1992; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001). However, other studies have claimed that these potential benefits might not be 
realized if the integration of larger acquired organizations creates greater coordination problems 
and needs resources to be devoted to solve this at the expense of business operations, thus 
leading to a negative impact of a merger (Lubatkin 1983; Kusewitt 1985; Ahuja and Katila, 
2001). 
The economic performance of a firm is proxied by firm growth and Tobin’s q. Firm 
growth is measured by the annual growth rate of the market value. Firms with growing market 
value may appear as likely acquisition targets for mature firms looking to absorb growth 
opportunities. We approximate Tobin’s q by calculating the ratio of the market value to the 
book value of a firm’s assets, where the former is the sum of the book value of long-term debt 
and the market value of common equity (Danzon et al., 2004). According to the q-theory of 
investment, capital should flow from low-q to high-q firms. Indeed, by knowledge flows, 
technology shocks cause a large variation in the firms’ Tobin’s q (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2004). The interpretation of the effect of Tobin’s q should be treated with some caution, 
because, apart from being a forward looking indicator - a firm’s growth opportunities (Gugler et 
al., 2004), Tobin’s q is also likely to reflect stock undervaluation (Mork et al., 1990), or 
managerial performance (Powell, 1997). 
The cash flow ratio is defined as the ratio of cash flow to the total assets, and it 
represents the financial capabilities of the firms. The cash-flow ratio amounts for funds 
available to a firm for operations, investments and acquisitions. Given the argument that R&D is 
primarily financed by internally generated resources, the cash-flow ratio might be an important 
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determinant of the (inclusively) choice between internal R&D or external know-how of 
innovative firms. 
We include a dummy variable which indicates missing R&D values and equals one 
when R&D is missing and zero otherwise (Hall, 1999). For the firm-years observations with 
missing R&D intensity, we then set the R&D intensity equal to zero. Moreover, to capture the 
difference between firms with no R&D output, we employ similarly a dummy for firms with 
zero (citation-weighted) patent intensity. 
Table 2 depicts the t-statistics of the differences in means of the firms’ characteristics 
separately for merged and non-merged firms. Firms that actually merged are characterized by a 
greater knowledge stock expressed in accumulated intellectual property rights than firms that 
did not merge. In terms of total assets, there is a significant size difference between merged and 
non-merged firms, thus showing that larger firms are more likely to merge.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The merged firms had, on average, a larger Tobin’s q and cash-flow ratio, and they were less 
likely to have missing R&D values and zero (citation-weighted) patent intensity. The firms in 
our sample do not differ significantly in their R&D and (citation-weighted) patent intensity as 
well as research productivity prior to a merger. 
 
4.1  Estimating the Impact of M&A on Innovation 
Our analysis of the effects of mergers controls for endogeneity and ex-ante observable firm 
characteristics using a propensity score method (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
For each firm i  in the sample, let iM  be a merger indicator that equals one when the 
firm engages in a merger and zero otherwise. We denote 1iY  as the innovation performance of 
merging and 0iY  as the innovation performance of non-merging firms and observe iM  and 
hence ( )1 01i i i i iY M Y M Y= ⋅ + − ⋅ . Accordingly, let 1 1 = i iE Y M and 0 0 = i iE Y M  denote 
average outcomes of the technological performances of merged and non-merged firms, 
respectively. The effect we are interested in is that of merger on the technological performance 
of the merged firms, or the difference between the expected innovative performances of the 
merged firms and the firms that would have experienced if they did not merge:  
 
=    = = − =   iM 1 i1 i i0 iE Y M 1 E Y M 1τ                                                                                 (3)                                                                                                                                
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This denotes the expected treatment effect on the treated. Since we do not have the 
counterfactual evidence of what would have happened if a firm had not engaged in a merger, 
0 1 = i iE Y M is unobservable. However, it can be estimated by 0 0 = i iE Y M and the effect 
can be then given by the difference in the average outcome between the merged and non-
merged innovative performances:  
 
    = = − =   
e
i1 i i0 i
E Y M 1 E Y M 0τ                                                                                      (4)                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
In fact, we have observations on the firms which did not engage in a merger, but if the merged 
and the non-merged firms systematically differ in their firm characteristics, (4) will be a biased 
estimator of (3) (Hirano et al., 2002).15  
Rubin (1997), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) showed that a propensity score 
analysis of observational data can be used to create groups of treated and control units that have 
similar characteristics, whereby comparisons can be made within these matched groups. In these 
groups, there are firms that have been merged and firms that have not been merged; hence, the 
allocation of the merger can be considered to be random inside the groups of firms. 
The merger propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of engaging in a merger 




( ) ( )Pr 1  = = =  i i i i ip M M X E M X                                                                                     (5) 
 
The treatment effect of a merger is then estimated as the expectation of the conditional effects 
over the distribution of the propensity score in the merged sample: 
 
( ) ( ){ }( ) , ,=    = = − = =   i iM 1 p M i1 i i i0 i i iE E Y p M M 1 E Y p M M 0 M 1τ
                         (6)                                
 
The propensity score matching relies on two key assumptions (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; 1984). The first, conditional independence assumption (CIA) requires that conditional on 
the propensity score potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. The CIA 
assumes that selection into treatment occurs only on observable characteristics. Hence, unbiased 
treatment effect estimates are obtained when we have controlled for all relevant covariates. The 
second assumption is the common support or overlap condition, meaning that firms must have a 
positive probability of being either merger and non-merger rather than just having same 
                                                 
15 Descriptive data in Table 2 show that merged and non-merged firms in our sample suggest significant differences 
in the observed characteristics. 
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covariate values. In sum, the propensity score matching relies on the “strong ignorability” 
assumption, which implies that for common values of covariates, the choice of treatment is not 
based on the benefits of alternative treatments. 
Using the stratification matching, we estimate the effects of a merger on innovation 
performance by taking the weighted average (by number of merged firms) of the within-strata 
average differences in performance outcomes between merged and non-merged firms. This is 
the average treatment effect on the treated referred to in the causal inference literature.  
 
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Technological Determinants of a Merger 
In this section, we examine the merger decision of the telecommunications equipment firms in a 
multivariate analysis. Given that both merging and non-merging firms are included in the 
sample, we can attempt to distinguish between the characteristics of merging firms in 
transaction events and the firms outside of the merger market. We estimate equation (2) using a 
multinomial logit model with four outcomes: to be an acquirer, to be acquired, to be a pooling 
merger, or to be not involved in a merger. There are substantial drawbacks associated with the 
use of the multinomial logit estimation because it assumes that the disturbances are independent 
across alternatives. This assumption suggests that if a firm was choosing between the four 
alternatives, then there is no relationship between a firm's disturbances for being an acquirer, a 
target, a partner in a pooling merger or does not involvement in a merger. In the context of this 
analysis, it is likely that merger behavior will not fulfill this requirement. The test of the 
maintained assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) will indicate whether the 
ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is entirely unaffected by the systematic 
utilities of any other alternatives. In order to examine how the estimation results are affected by 
this property, four Hausman tests were conducted. The results from multinomial logit are 
compared with those from a binomial logits between the non-merged firms sample and each of 
the samples of acquiring, acquired and pooling merged firms as well as between acquirer and 
pooling merger samples. The p-values associated with the resulting test statistics were .88, .93, 
.76, and .67, respectively. Therefore, the null hypotheses are not rejected each, which implies 
that the IIA assumption does not adversely affect the estimates. Furthermore, the results of the 
binomial logit regressions were almost identical to those of multinomial logit model. This also 
substantiates that the independence assumption is not a concern of our analysis, and we can 
utilize robust estimates of the variance of the estimated coefficients. 
 15
Table 3 presents the marginal effects for the multinomial logit regressions. The statistics 
for the joint hypothesis and likelihood ratio tests are also reported. All estimated models are 
highly significant as indicated by the likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the slope 
coefficients are jointly zero, which are rejected at the 1 percent level using the chi-square test 
statistic. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Merging firms as a whole seem to have, on average, a significantly different innovative 
profile compared to that of non-merging firms. Larger firms, as measured by the book value of 
total assets, are more likely to engage in merger activity. This suggests that large firms are more 
willing to make use of their large and more stable internal funds to finance external R&D 
projects. A 100 percent increase in a firm’s total assets is associated with a .0026 and .0005 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of acquiring another firm and being involved in a 
pooling merger, respectively, which is a .37 and a 1.67 percent increase in each probability. 
The significantly positive effect of the cash flow ratio on the likelihood to acquire 
another firm suggests that acquiring firms have considerable cash to run a larger firm and 
agency controls are imperfect. This is in accordance with the evidence that possessing the 
ability to finance a merger tends to precipitate acquisitions. Firms with a relatively low cash 
flow ratio tend not to engage in a merger due to their financial constraints. Thus, either 
imperfect agency concerns or availability of financing are significant constraints on 
acquisitions. 
In the current sample, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between 
the variables confirming the growth opportunities of firms, which are growth in market value 
and Tobin’s q, and the probability that a firm is engaged in a merger.  
When we take the proposed determinants on innovative performance of the firms into 
account, then, at first, the merging firms are more likely to have a large accumulated citation-
based patent stock. This evidence seems to be in accordance with the theoretical argument that a 
large stock of accumulated knowledge is essential if the acquirer (or one partner in a pooling 
merger) is to have the necessary absorptive capacity to identify the appropriate target (or 
another partner in a pooling merger). The fact that firms with a rather low accumulated 
knowledge stock are less likely to engage in a merger supports this evidence. 
Next, firms with greater R&D and citation-based patent intensities have a greater 
propensity to undertake acquisitions. These results seem to mutually support the hypothesis that 
higher levels of relative absorptive capacity and the strengthening of its creation on the part of 
research-focused firms are necessary for those firms to incorporate and exploit new research 
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into their R&D programs effectively. We also obtain a significantly negative coefficient of the 
dummy for acquiring firms when R&D expenditure is not reported, which are expected to have 
zero or low R&D intensity. Therefore, the acquirer are more likely to have non zero R&D input 
in the year before the merger. At the same time, the non-merging firms tend to have more 
frequent zero R&D intensity than merging firms. 
After controlling for R&D and citation-based patent intensities, we find that the 
likelihood of becoming an acquirer is higher with the lower R&D productivity of firms. 
Although the acquiring firms experienced higher input and output in R&D, they seem to carry 
either a low number of patents and/or a relatively low-valued patents yield of R&D dollars 
before acquisitions. As mentioned above, large firms are often argued to have a lower R&D 
productivity than that of their somewhat smaller rivals because research conducted in most large 
laboratories is found to generate predominantly minor improvement inventions rather than new 
major inventions. This result suggests that an enhanced desire to acquire new technology and 
innovation-related assets driven by declining returns from the exploitation of the firms’ existing 
knowledge base exists. At this step of the analysis, we are yet cautious about this indication, 
since the target probability regression provides insignificant results on marginal effects. The 
lack of preciseness in the target estimation may due to the fact that the probability of being 
acquired greatly varies among the small sample of target firms. We will come back to this point 
as some predications regarding the target firms’ pre-merger performance can be derived from 
the next step of our analysis. 
An interesting result is that firms with a poor accumulated citation-weighted patent 
stock and, at the same time, presenting higher R&D productivity tend to not engage in a merger. 
We ascribe these firms to be relatively young and with significantly new know-how. The 
negative effect of firm size on the propensity to stay outside of the merger activity also seems to 
point toward that direction. Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model, 
which are not reported here, indicate that acquisition targets possessed a significantly large 
accumulated knowledge stock than the non-merged firms. 
Finally, firms that experienced a low R&D output are more likely to be involved in a 
pooling, suggesting that the lack of innovation is an important driving force behind the merger 
activity. There is no significant relationship between R&D productivity and the propensity to go 
through a pooling merger that would further confirm this evidence. 
 
5.2 Post-Merger Innovation Performance 
Implementing the matching requires choosing a set of variables that satisfy the 
plausibility of the CIA. This implies that only variables that simultaneously influence the 
merger decision and the outcome variable(s) should be included. The outcomes of the firms’ 
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innovation performance are defined as the annual growth rates of the innovation determinants, 
e.g., we analyze the post-merger annual percentage changes of innovation input and output, 
knowledge stock and research productivity. In order to derive the merger propensity score, we 
estimated the multinomial logit model of equation (2) with annual percentage changes of the 
innovation and financials covariates used in our first step of analysis as well as their interaction 
terms. 
In order to check the common support region, we compare the maximum and minimum 
propensity scores in the merged and non-merged groups. That is, we discard all observations 
whose propensity score is smaller than minimum and larger than maximum in the opposite 
group. As a consequence, any observations lying outside the region of common support given 
by [0.0072,0.6101] are excluded. Almost 42.6 percent of non-merged firms have a propensity 
score below 0.1, while 7.3 percent of merged firms have the same low propensity scores.16 Since 
the number of treated firms lost due to common support requirement amounts up to 3 percent of 
the treated group and there are still comparable control firms to remaining treated firms, a good 
overlap in the estimated propensities scores for merged and non-merged firms in the sample is 
verified.  
The data in the region of propensity score overlap were subclassified into five blocks 
defined by the quintiles of the propensity scores for merged firms. 17 To check for the adequacy 
of the propensity score model, we then used a two-way ANOVA to assess whether the 
propensity score balances each covariate between the merged and non-merged groups of firms. 
Each covariate is regressed on the merger and the propensity score stratum indicator and their 
interaction as factors. The insignificant effects of mergers and insignificant effects of the 
interaction between propensity score stratum and merger indicators determine that the 
distributions of the covariates within the sub-classes are the same for merged and non-merged 
firms.18 The results of T-tests of the differences in outcome means in both groups after the 
stratification matching are shown in Table 4. The balance in covariates of merged and non-
merged firms assures an unbiased estimate of the effect of a merger on the innovation 
performance (Dehejia and Wahba, 1990). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since the full impact of mergers on the innovation performance takes time and results 
may not be evident immediately., we examine the impact of a merger in year t on the change in 
                                                 
16 Rosenbaum (1984) argues that low propensity score below than 0.1 percent is not uncommon in distributions of 
propensity score estimates, even for treatment observations. 
17 Five sub-classes (quintiles) constructed from the propensity scores will often suffice to remove over 90% of the 
selection bias due to each of the covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). 
18 Before subclassification, we found using one-way ANOVA significant effects of mergers on more covariates. 
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outcomes from  to + +t 1 t 2 ,  to + +t 2 t 3 and  to + +t 3 t 4 , in order to capture the long-run 
post-merger performance .19  
Table 5 reports our findings on the effects of mergers on innovation performance. The 
impact of mergers appears to be more concentrated in the first year following a merger. Herein, 
stronger results are obtained for our main variables which more strictly explain the firm’s 
innovation performance. 
First, the annual percentage change of R&D intensity displays a significantly positive 
sign in all three years following a merger. Hence, according to our previous result from the first 
stage of the analysis, this indicates that the strong R&D intensity of acquiring firms positively 
influences the assimilation of the external knowledge by supplementing in-house R&D effort. 
Moreover, it suggests that the firms engaged in the mergers did not depreciate their investments 
in R&D on behalf of financing the transaction.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, we find that mergers are followed by an improvement in the accumulated citation-
based patent stock. In addition to the partners in a pooling merger, who possessed a large 
accumulated knowledge stock prior a merger, the targets also tend to be firms with highly 
valued patent stock. This result is in accordance with our prediction that accumulated 
knowledge stock confers an ability to recognize the new knowledge in environment and this 
ability seem to enhance the technological strengths even further. 
The merged firms experience a significantly positive impact on the (citation-based) 
patent intensity compared to those outcomes that these firms would have reached if they had not 
been merged. Due to the fact that the acquiring firms had a higher citation-based patent intensity 
prior acquisitions, this effect suggests that an intensification of high-valued patents creation 
relative to the firm’s assets base prior an acquisition generates a significantly high innovation 
output of the merged entity. Additionally, the pooling partners which faced some absence of 
innovation efficiency in terms of the innovation output seem to grow following a merger, 
potentially because the merger provided access to technological resources which the firms 
previously lacked. 
Furthermore, the insignificant result on the post-merger research productivity suggests 
that the marginal returns from R&D investments do not change with respect to the innovation 
output. At the same time, merged and non-merged firms do not significantly differ in their 
                                                 
19 We cannot compare pre- and post-merger performance of merged firms with the matched sample of non-merging 
firms over the same time period because we lack pre-merger accounting data for one component of the merged entity 
for a significant fraction of our mergers. 
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financial characteristics such as cash flow ratio and Tobin’s q, at least for the observation 
period. 
Finally, we find a significant increase in the following variables reflecting the firms’ 
economic performance. Firstly, there is a firm’s size growth effect with respect to the annual 
percentage changes in the total assets as typically expected. Secondly, the positively significant 
increase in the annual growth of the market value on average confirms that, in the first year 
following the mergers, overall returns for shareholders are above those of the non-merged firms 
with similar characteristics.  
 
6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
CIA assumes that the effects of casual merger are not influenced by any correlation between 
unobserved factors and a firm’s selection into casual merger. Hence, the treatment effect 
estimators are not robust against “hidden bias” if unobserved factors like managerial skills and 
technological shocks that affect the merger are also correlated with the outcomes. After the 
adjusting for selection bias due to non-overlapping support and discrepancies in the distribution 
between merged and non-merged firms, the purpose of sensitivity analysis is to determine 
whether or not inference about treatment effects may be altered by unobservable variables in 
order to undermine our conclusions of matching analysis. While it is not possible to estimate the 
magnitude of selection bias with non-experimental data, the bounding approach proposed by 
Rosenbaum (2002) does provide a way of judging how strongly an unmeasured confounding 
variable must affect the selection process.  
If we let ui be an unmeasured covariate that affects the probability pi of a firm i of 
selecting into the treatment and xi are the observed covariates that determine treatment and 
outcome variable, then treatment assignment can be described as  
 
( )i i i
i
p






                                                                                                        (7) 
 
where i0 u 1≤ ≤ . 
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that this relationship implies the following bounds on the odds ratio 













                                                                                                                 (8) 
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where ( )( )i jexp u uΓ γ= − . 
Because of the bounds on u, a given value of γ  measures the degree of which the difference 
between selection probabilities can be a result of hidden bias. 1γ = and thus 1Γ = imply that 
both matched firms have the same probability of the engaging in a merger and thus no hidden 
bias exist. Increasing values of Γ imply an increasingly influence of unobservables, if they 
exist, on the selection decision. In other words, if a large value of Γ does alter inferences about 
the merger effect, the study is sensitive to selection bias.  
We adopt Becker and Galiendo’s (2007) procedure for bounding treatment effect 
estimates for binary outcomes and define an new outcome variables which take the binary 
values according to the annual growth of performance outcomes.20 Table 6 contains the results 
of the sensitivity analysis for the significant effects of the mergers on the annual growth of the 
firms’ innovation input and output, and knowledge stock in the first year following a merger.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
We show the Mantel and Haenszel (MH,1959) test statistics for the averaged treatment 
effect on the treated while setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value Γ . The MH test 
statistics is used to test the null hypothesis of no merger effect and at each Γ  we calculate a 
hypothetical significance level “p-critical”, which represents the bound on the significance level 
of the treatment effect in the case of endogenous self-selection into treatment. Given the 
positive estimated treatment effects and thus looking at the bounds under the assumption that we 
have overestimated the true treatment effects, reveals that robustness to hidden bias varies 
across the outcome variables.21 Under the assumption of no hidden bias ( e 1
γ = ), the MH test 
statistics provide a similar results suggesting significant merger effects. The finding of a 
positive effect of mergers on the patent intensity is at least robust to the possible presence of 
selection bias. The critical value of e
γ
 is 1.20 indicating that firms with the same observable 
characteristics differ in their odds of treatment by 20 percent. Next, the critical value of e
γ
at 
which we would have to question our conclusion of a positive effect on the R&D intensity is 
between 1.40 and 1.60. However, the Rosenbaum bounds are worst-case scenarios. Hence, a 
critical value of 1.40 does not mean that unobserved heterogeneity exist and there is no merger 
effect on the innovation input. This result means that the confidence interval for the R&D 
                                                 
20 Stata module mhbounds (Becker and Galiendo, 2007) is applied for the case of binary outcome variables. We 
define an outcome variable taking the value 1 if a firm had a positive annual growth an 0 otherwise. 
21 The significance levels p+ calculated under assumption of overestimation treatment effect are presented. 
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intensity effect would include zero if the odds ratio of treatment assignment differs between the 
merged and non-merged firms by 1.40 due to an unobserved variable. Furthermore, the effect on 
the knowledge stock remains significantly positive even in the presence of substantial 
unobserved bias by a factor of 2. This result imply that if an unobserved variable caused the 
odds ratio of merging to differ between the merged and non-merged firms by a factor of as 
much as 2, the 90 percent confidence interval would still exclude zero. Thus the positive 
estimated effects on the firms’ innovation input and knowledge stock are robust to the 
unobserved heterogeneity, while the positive effect on the patenting intensity is less so. 
 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper delivers insights into the desirability of M&A for the innovation performance of 
firms by analyzing the mergers that took place in the international telecommunications 
equipment industry from the late 1980s until the early 2000s. We provide evidence on strictly 
complementary as well as mutually supportive results. The overwhelming conclusion that arises 
from the analysis is that, on average, mergers realize significantly positive changes to the 
innovation performance of firms following a merger. The post-merger changes are in turn 
driven by both the success in R&D activity and the weakness in internal technological 
capabilities at acquiring firms prior to a merger. 
The findings about the innovation-related characteristics of the merging firms have 
interesting implications for the propositions about the rationale of mergers set out in our 
theoretical section. According to the absorptive capacity theory (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
Chesbrough, 2003), firms with a greater R&D intensity and a larger stock of accumulated 
knowledge have a greater propensity to engage in the technological-related mergers, and these 
underlying higher levels of absorptive capacity convincingly indicate the necessity for the 
identification, the assimilation and the exploitation of the targets’ technological knowledge. The 
analysis provides strong evidence, according to which firms with rapid R&D and firms that 
extensively apply the results of scientific advances to their own R&D results, e.g., inventions, 
acquire better quality patents. Moreover, unobserved factors which select firms into casual 
mergers do not appear to be correlated with unobserved factors which influence their innovation 
input and knowledge stock. 
We find support for the view that firms experiencing a decline in internal research 
productivity or which are more inefficient in inventive output are more likely to engage in an 
acquisition or a pooling merger, respectively, as an effort to boost their research pipelines. In 
effect, firms which face greater distress in the effectiveness of patenting activity appear to grow 
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their invention intensity following a merger, which is probably because the merger provided a 
rectified access to the appropriate technological resources. However, increased patenting may 
not be directly resulting from higher R&D intensity and accordingly not related to protecting 
investment in R&D (Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Hall, 2001). Particularly, the increased (citation-
weighted) patent intensity following a merger could stem from technological and managerial 
improvements. That is, the merged firms had redirected more of their R&D investments toward 
applied rather than basic research and/or improved their innovation management. Since the 
mergers have, on average, an insignificant effect on the research productivity of the merged 
firms, this interpretation is quite tentative. Nevertheless, an increase in the inventive output 
intensity of the merged firms following a merger is suggestive of improvements to the 
underlying research portfolio as this is a direct measure of a firm’s innovation performance. 
After controlling for hidden bias, we do, however, find a week evidence that merged firms are 
more intensive than their counterfactual non-merged firms in the patenting activity on average. 
Furthermore, we find that larger firms with strong internal funds to finance R&D are 
more likely to acquire and to engage in a pooling merger, whereas the firms which lack these 
characteristics are more likely to pursue technology internally. Solely relying on in-house R&D, 
non-merged firms are appear to be rather young and small market challengers, which are 
striving to rival the market establisher with a significantly new and/or advanced technology on 
their own. Contrary to these firms, the acquired firms seem to be experienced entrepreneurs that 
have succeeded in the past at generating larger and high-valued inventions.  
The analysis reveals that mergers are, on average, a positive experience for 
shareholders, at least for a short-time span. Moreover, the finding that, in the long-run, mergers 
did not cut R&D spending suggests that post-merger R&D effort is not affected by financial 
resource constraints induced by the transaction and integration processes. 
With respect to the average effects of mergers, the analysis has clearly shown that the 
merged firms faced different outcomes regarding the post-merger innovation performance. One 
potential explanation of the variability in the performances might be due to different financing 
of the mergers transactions. The decision on merger financing has important implications for 
merger capital structure, future profitability, subsequent financing choices and ownership 
structure. Therefore, it might have a significant impact on the R&D performance of a merger 
too. How and to what extend the merger financing choice affects firms’ post-merger innovation 
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Indicator for Missing R&D Expenses 
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   1.90* 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * difference in sample means is significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Marginal Effects of the Propensity of Involvement in M&A Activity 
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0.142 0.62 0.010 0.71 0.921 -1.24 0.162 0.59 
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Notes: Reported are means. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **  and * indicate a significance level     of 

































1.20 [1.7896; 2.5660] 0.0113 
 
[1.4226; 2.2627] 0.0843 [1.0452; 1.8044] 0.0003 
1.40 [1.5221; 2.9142] 0.0401 
 
[1.2476; 2.5704] 0.2910 [1.5905; 2.0123] 0.0051 
1.60 [1.3764; 3.2422] 0.1211 
 
[1.1898; 2.8621] 0.3200 [0.0864; 2.3213] 0.0124 
1.80 [1.1644; 3.5521] 0.2523 
 
[1.1342; 3.1394] 0.5171 [0.0657; 2.7868] 0.0594 
2.00 [1.0897; 3.8461] 0.2973 
 
[1.0698; 3.4764] 0.5940 [0.0266; 2.9612] 0.0821 
 
Notes: Q+-MH and Q--MH are Mantel-Haenszel test statistics under assumptions of overestimated and 
underestimated treatment effects. Significance levels are under assumption of overestimation of treatment effects. 
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